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Abstract
This paper studies welfare consequences of a soft borrowing constraint on sovereign debt which
is modeled as a proportional ﬁne per unit of debt exceeding some reference value. Debt is
the result of myopic ﬁscal policy where the government is assumed to have a smaller discount
factor than the private sector. Due to the absence of lump-sum taxation, debt reduces welfare.
The paper shows that the imposition of a soft borrowing constraint, which resembles features
of the Stability and Growth Pact and which is taken into account by the policy maker when
setting its instruments, prevents excessive borrowing. The constraint can be implemented
such as to (i) control the long run level of debt, (ii) prevent debt accumulation, and (iii)
induce debt consolidation. In all three cases the constraint enhances welfare and in a welfare
ranking these gains outweigh the short run welfare losses of increasing the costs of using debt
to smooth taxes over the business cycle.
Keywords: Myopic governments; debt bias; ﬁscal constraints; Stability and Growth Pact;
social welfare.
JEL classiﬁcation: H3, H63, E6.5
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Non-technical summary
In 2010 the average debt to GDP ratio of the OECD countries reaches 100%. In the Euro
Area this ratio was 70% already before the outset of the ﬁnancial crisis. In the absence of
lump-sum taxation, high levels of debt reduce social welfare due to the deadweight loss of the
taxes needed to service that debt. This paper analyzes how debt and the associated welfare
costs can be reduced. It ﬁrst measures these costs. Then, it proposes a legal restriction on
ﬁscal policy in form of a borrowing constraint and shows how such a restriction leads to an
enhancement of social welfare.
According to standard economic theory, a benevolent government will use debt only to
smooth taxes in response to budget ﬂuctuations. In the long run debt should be near zero or
even negative. However, this prescription contrasts with the observed levels of sovereign debt
in most OECD countries. To account for this observation, in the model the government is
assumed to be myopic, i.e. it has a lower discount factor than the private sector, giving rise to
a ‘debt bias’. Myopia can be interpreted as the result of an expected ﬁnite planning horizon of
the government. Moreover, the government has only access to distortionary taxation in order
to ﬁnance an exogenously given stream of government consumption. Combined, positive
levels of debt and the absence of lump-sum taxation are the source of welfare costs in the
model and provide the motivation for an analysis of a debt constraint. More speciﬁcally,
the paper proposes a constraint on debt but where full compliance by the government is not
ensured. The government can violate the constraint but this violation is associated with
the payment of a proportional ﬁne to a supranational institution. Rather than a hard 0/1
constraint on sovereign debt, the proposed mechanism hence constitutes a ‘soft borrowing
constraint’ (SBC). The reference value of debt and the tightness of the SBC are treated as
if controlled by a supranational institution, resembling features of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). The model shows that the proposed SBC can bring down debt to zero in the
long run and thereby eliminates the main source of welfare costs, namely positive levels of
debt in steady state.
The paper analyses the welfare implications of the SBC in the following four scenarios,
providing a welfare ranking according to the relative welfare gains/ losses of the SBC in each
of them: First, it considers only long run eﬀects. For the baseline calibration government
myopia leads to a level of debt to GDP of about 100%. This is associated with welfare costs
of 0.353% in terms of consumption relative to the zero debt steady state under the fully
benevolent planner. The paper shows that by setting the tightness and the reference value of6
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debt in the SBC appropriately the supranational institution can bring down debt to zero in
the long run, preventing these welfare losses. In the second scenario the paper accounts for
the transitional period to the high debt steady state. The paper shows that the imposition
of the SBC prevents this transition and the associated welfare costs of 0.141%. Third, the
paper considers a debt consolidating transition, induced by the imposition of the SBC, from
a high debt steady state without SBC to a new steady state with SBC. The paper shows that
for the optimal combination of the tightness of the SBC and the reference value of debt it is
possible to induce debt consolidation and realize welfare gains of 0.099%. Finally, the paper
looks at the short run dynamics of myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC which are compared to
the optimal policy of the fully benevolent planner without SBC. Welfare costs of the SBC
amount to 0.001% because the SBC increases the costs of using debt to smooth taxes over
the business cycle. The relative welfare costs in the four considered scenarios reﬂect the
conclusion of Lucas (2003) that welfare gains from improved long run policies tend to exceed
the potential from further improvements in short run policies. Thus, the paper supports the
views of those who like to strengthen the rules of the SGP. It also provides an argument for
the inclusion of a debt break into the German constitution or for the advocates of balanced
budget rules.7
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1 Introduction
How can high levels of debt and the associated welfare costs be reduced? In 2010 the average
debt to GDP ratio of the OECD countries reaches 100%.1 In the Euro Area this ratio was
70% already before the outset of the ﬁnancial crisis.2 In the absence of lump-sum taxation,
high levels of debt reduce social welfare due to the deadweight loss of the taxes needed to
service that debt.3 This paper analyzes how debt and the associated welfare costs can be
reduced. It ﬁrst measures these costs. Then, it proposes a legal restriction on ﬁscal policy
and shows how such a restriction leads to an enhancement of social welfare.
According to standard economic theory, a benevolent government will use debt only to
smooth taxes in response to budget ﬂuctuations. In the long run debt should be near zero
or even negative.4 However, this prescription contrasts with the observed levels of sovereign
debt in most OECD countries. To account for this observation, in the model the government
is assumed to have an objective which diﬀers from that of the representative household.
The set-up of the model is as follows. There are two distortions in the economy. First,
following the standard approach of optimal ﬁscal policy, the government has only access
to distortionary taxation in order to ﬁnance an exogenously given stream of government
consumption. Second, introducing a political distortion, the government is myopic, i.e. it
has a lower discount factor than the private sector, giving rise to a ‘debt bias’. Myopia can
be interpreted as the result of an expected ﬁnite planning horizon of the government. These
two distortions combined are the source of welfare costs and provide the motivation for an
analysis of a debt constraint. More speciﬁcally, the paper proposes a constraint on debt
but where full compliance by the government is not ensured. The government can violate
the constraint but this violation is associated with the payment of a ﬁne. Rather than a
hard 0/1 constraint on sovereign debt, the proposed mechanism hence constitutes a ‘soft
borrowing constraint’ (SBC). The SBC resembles features of the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) which is a particular example of such a mechanism. In the limit, i.e. for very high
ﬁnes associated with a violation of the constraint, the SBC implies a balanced budget rule.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that the proposed SBC enhances welfare in
an economy where the optimizing government takes into account this SBC as well as the
equilibrium reactions of households.
The model builds on Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002). The government has
1See OECD (2009).
2See ECB (2009).
3See, for example, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
4See, for example, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002).8
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to ﬁnance an exogenously given and stochastic stream of government consumption. It has
access to ﬂat rate taxes on labour income and issues one-period non-state-contingent bonds.
For the sake of realism, markets for government bonds are thus incomplete. I include the
following two features into this set up.
First, the government is myopic. Myopia is modeled as a lower discount factor of the
government than that of the private sector. Myopia can be interpreted as the result of
an expected ﬁnite planning horizon which corresponds to the prospective duration of the
government’s survival in power, following Grossman and Van Huyck (1988). The diﬀerence
between the discount factors creates a debt bias: The policy maker lowers tax rates in the
near future by issuing debt. In the long run, this policy leads to a positive level of debt which
in turn requires higher taxes to ﬁnance higher debt servicing costs. Persson and Svensson
(1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), among others, model the political process which
gives rise to the debt bias as a political conﬂict between diﬀerent interest groups.5 Here,
I follow Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) and assume that the government is myopic but
otherwise benevolent because it allows staying conceptually close to the standard normative
approach of the Ramsey planner which can then be used as a natural benchmark to compute
the welfare consequences of the SBC.6
Second, following Beetsma, Ribeiro, and Schabert (2008), I introduce a SBC which is
modeled as a proportional ﬁne per unit of debt exceeding some reference value.7 The SBC
includes a threshold on debt which is taken into account by the government when maximizing
its objective. However, the constraint can be violated by the government which then has to
pay the associated ﬁne. The reference value of debt and the tightness of the SBC are treated
as if controlled by a supranational institution and are thus taken as given by the government.
I show that the proposed SBC can bring down debt to zero in the long run and thereby
eliminates the main source of welfare costs, namely positive levels of debt in steady state.
To provide a ranking of the welfare implications of the SBC, I consider the following four
scenarios: First, for illustration purposes and to obtain a quantitative impression of both
stochastic and non-stochastic steady state eﬀects, I consider only long run welfare eﬀects
of myopia and the SBC. For the baseline calibration government myopia leads to a level
of debt to GDP of about 100%. This is associated with welfare costs of 0.353% in terms
of consumption relative to the zero debt steady state under the fully benevolent planner.
5See Alesina and Perotti (1994) for a review of the political economy of budget deﬁcits.
6This assumption is also used by Kumhof and Yakadina (2007).
7While this speciﬁcation resembles features of the SGP, the aim is not to model the precise deﬁcit procedure
prescribed by the rules of the SGP.9
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The paper shows that by setting the tightness and the reference value of debt in the SBC
appropriately the supranational institution can bring down debt to zero in the long run,
preventing these costs. In the second scenario I account for the transitional period to a high
debt steady state which leads to welfare costs of 0.141%. I show that the imposition of the
SBC prevents the transition and the associated costs. Third, I consider a debt consolidating
transition, induced by the imposition of the SBC, from a high debt steady state without SBC
to a new steady state with SBC. I show that for the optimal combination of the tightness
of the SBC and the reference value of debt it is possible to induce debt consolidation from
100% of GDP to 40% and thereby realize welfare gains of 0.099%. Finally, I look at the short
run dynamics of myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC which are compared to the optimal policy
of the fully benevolent planner without SBC. Welfare costs of the SBC amount to 0.001%
because the SBC increases the costs of using debt to smooth taxes over the business cycle.
The relative welfare costs in the four considered scenarios reﬂect the conclusion of Lucas
(2003) that welfare gains from improved long run policies tend to exceed the potential from
further improvements in short run policies.8
The next section lays out the model and the policy problem. Section 3 presents the
calibration and the welfare measure. Section 4 provides the results. Section 5 discusses the
results and their sensitivity to alternative assumptions before Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, I ﬁrst describe the economy and deﬁne the competitive equilibrium for a given
policy. Then, I set up the policy problem and deﬁne the equilibrium under optimizing ﬁscal
policy. Finally, I analyze the equilibrium and its steady state. The sources of uncertainty in
the economy are government consumption and productivity. The shocks to these variables
materialize at the beginning of each period and are observed by all agents when taking their
decisions. Moreover, all agents have rational expectations.
8The numbers in case four are smaller than in Stockman (2001) who ﬁnds larger welfare costs associated
with a balanced budget regime. However, he derives his results from an economy with capital and complete
markets. Further, the role of balanced budget rules as an additional source of instability, as suggested by
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (1997), is not considered in my welfare analysis. Moreover, I do not consider beneﬁts
of government debt for households as in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). Finally, it should be mentioned that,
given the level of abstraction of the theoretical model, the welfare results are used to provide a welfare ranking
of the consequences of the SBC under alternative scenarios rather than to provide realistic estimates of the
welfare eﬀects of the SBC.10
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2.1 Private sector
The private sector consists of households, ﬁrms, and a ﬁnancial intermediary. There is no
population growth and no technological progress.
2.1.1 Households
Households are identical, inﬁnitely-lived, and of mass one. The objective of a representative





where ct denotes consumption, nt working time, β (0,1) is the discount factor, and u(c,n)
is additively separable. The household’s total amount of time is normalized to one and is
divided between working time and leisure. It earns the wage rate wt and has to pay a ﬂat-
rate tax τt on labour income. The household can invest in one-period non-state-contingent
government bonds bt+1 at the period t price 1/Rt ,w h e r eRt is the gross rate of return.
For the sake of realism, markets are thus incomplete like in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and




+Φ t ≤ (1 − τt)wtnt + bt + πt, (2)
where Φt are transaction costs which have to be paid to a ﬁnancial intermediary when the
household enters the capital market, maintaining either a short or a long position. They are
assumed to be quadratic in the ratio of bond holdings over per capita output and proportional










Following Heaton and Lucas (1996), rather than trading costs, the transaction costs can be
interpreted as a wedge between the borrowing and lending rates due to monitoring and other
costs incurred each period, depending on the stock of debt outstanding. The transaction
costs imply that an increase of the level of debt to GDP leads to an increase of the interest
rate on government bonds. This implication commands broad empirical support (see Gale
and Orszag, 2003, Engen and Hubbard, 2004, or Laubach, 2009). Here, the transaction
costs ensure the existence of a well deﬁned steady state in all considered scenarios (see
Sections 2.4 and 4). The main advantage of this functional form, which follows Schmitt-11
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Groh´ e and Uribe (2003), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Kumhof and Yakadina (2007), is
its analytical tractability.9 The ﬁrms’ and ﬁnancial intermediary’s proﬁts πt are redistributed
to the household in a lump-sum way.
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3) and a no-Ponzi-game condition which
prevents the household to make excessive debts.10 The ﬁrst order conditions can be combined
to










Moreover, the transversality condition holds: limt→∞ βt+1E0 [uc,t+1bt+1] = 0. Equation (5)
shows that an increase of the ratio of debt to GDP tends to increase the interest rate via an
increase of transaction costs.
2.1.2 Firms and ﬁnancial intermediary
Competitive ﬁrms produce with the linear production function yt = atnt,w h e r eat denotes
productivity which follows an exogenously given stochastic process. They pay a wage rate
equal to the marginal product of labour: wt = at. The ﬁnancial intermediary has zero
marginal and ﬁxed costs and since ﬁrms make zero proﬁts Φt = πt holds.
2.2 Government and resource constraint
The government has to ﬁnance an exogenously given and stochastic stream of government
consumption gt. It has access to ﬂat-rate taxes on labour income and issues one-period
non-state-contingent bonds. The government’s objective is described in detail in the next
subsection.
I introduce a constraint on the public debt which takes the form of a soft borrowing con-
straint (SBC). In particular, the government has to pay a ﬁne to a supranational institution
whenever beginning of period debt bt exceeds a time-invariant reference value, denoted by
bref. The debt-based criterion of the SGP could be interpreted as an example of such a SBC.
The tightness of the SBC is governed by the policy parameter κ. Let the SBC be denoted
9For the ease of interpretation, the transaction costs are speciﬁed relative to GDP. Alternatively, they could
be speciﬁed in terms of debt alone which however leaves all the results virtually unchanged.
10The presence of the transaction costs Φt in the household’s budget constraint (2) does not alter the
structure of the no-Ponzi-game condition. To see this, iterate forward (2) by successively eliminating bt+1+j
and notice that Φt enters the budget constraint additively separable.12
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1 if bt >b ref
0 if bt ≤ bref . (7)
The ﬁne has only to be paid if the level of debt exceeds the reference value bref.T h e
government does not receive subsidies for levels of debt below bref. The SBC allows for
transitory as well as permanent deviations from bref.F o r κ →∞the SBC converges to a
balanced budget rule. The policy parameters κ and bref are treated as if controlled by the
supranational institution, like in case of the SGP. They are taken as given by the government.
The aim of the following analysis is to assess the eﬀects of the SBC and to determine the
optimal values of κ and bref. The government budget constraint reads
gt + bt =
bt+1
Rt
+ τtwtnt − ft. (8)
Since the ﬁne payments are assumed to be made to the supranational institution, they
are resource costs to the economy.11 The resource constraint of the economy is given by
yt = ct + gt + ft. (9)
Now, for a given government policy (which will be determined in detail below), a com-
petitive equilibrium can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. For a given government policy {bt,τt}
∞
t=0 satisfying the government budget
constraint (8), a competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct,n t,f t,R t,w t,y t,Φt,πt}
∞
t=0
satisfying (3)- (6), (9), yt = atnt, wt = at, Φt = πt, and the transversality condition for
given exogenous processes {at,g t}
∞
t=0 and an initial value b0.
2.3 Policy problem
Fiscal policy in the majority of OECD countries over the last few decades points to a ‘debt
bias’. One possible reason for the debt bias is that governments may not be re-elected, and
as a result may discount the future more heavily than the private sector. In order to account
for this observation, I assume that the government is myopic, i.e. it has a smaller discount
11In Section 5, I discuss the alternative of introducing the ﬁne at a national level (for example by changing
the constitution by the required majority) and redistributing it to the household in a lump-sum way.13
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factor than the households, but that it is otherwise benevolent and applies the instantaneous





t u(ct,n t), (10)
where 0 <γ≤ 1. Myopia can be interpreted as the result of an expected ﬁnite planning
horizon of the incumbent government corresponding to the expected duration in power, fol-
lowing Grossman and Van Huyck (1988). In a quarterly model, the term h =1 /[4(1 − γ)]
can then be interpreted as the expected planning horizon in years.
If γ = 1, the objectives of the household and the government are identical (see 1 and
10) which gives the reference case of the fully benevolent Ramsey planner. If γ<1t h e
two objectives diﬀer and the government is myopic. A discount factor of γβ < β makes the
issuance of new debt relatively attractive for the government since it would be willing to pay
a higher interest rate than that demanded by the household, giving rise to a debt bias. This
framework is convenient for the purpose of this paper because it allows staying conceptually
close to the standard approach of the Ramsey planner which can then be used as a natural
benchmark to assess the welfare eﬀects of the SBC.
The politically optimal plan of the government can then be derived as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. To derive the politically optimal plan the government maximizes (10) over
competitive equilibria by choosing sequences of tax rates τt and bonds bt+1 subject to the gov-
ernment budget constraint (8), given an initial value b0 and exogenous processes {at,g t}
∞
t=0.
There is a multiplicity of competitive equilibria indexed by diﬀerent government policies.
Deﬁnition 2 implies that the government picks the equilibrium which maximizes (10) and that
the policy maker takes into account the existence of the SBC and the equilibrium reaction of
the private sector.
To derive the politically optimal plan, I follow the methodology of the Ramsey primal ap-
proach. In particular, I derive a sequence of implementability constraints, following Aiyagari,
Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002). To start, I substitute out prices Rt and wt and taxes
τt in the household’s budget constraint (2) by using the household’s ﬁrst order conditions (4)














where I used that Φt = πt. Now, I iterate forward (11), apply the law of iterated expectations,14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1308
March 2011















Incomplete markets imply that at the end of each period the government has to form new
expectations, depending on the realization of shocks today, of the future state of the economy.
This in turn implies that the price of debt Rt as well as the expected present value of the
budget surplus depends on the formed expectations and the realization of shocks today.13
The reaction of the private sector to the government’s policy is summarized by (12). Using
(6) and yt = atnt, the resource constraint of the economy reads









Equations (12) and (13) summarize the restrictions on the set of allocations the government
can achieve.14
Let ηt and αt denote the Lagrange multipliers on the resource and implementability





t {u(ct,n t) (14)
+ηt
 


































, I approximate the indicator function with a continuous transition function which
allows applying standard local approximation methods.15 In particular, I use the logistic
12For a derivation of the sequence of implementability constraints see Appendix A.
13 In the case of complete markets, the debt payoﬀ can be conditioned on the state of the economy such
that the present value of the future surplus across diﬀerent current states is known in advance and might diﬀer
across current states. This ﬂexibility of the contract between the government and the household implies that
it is possible to reduce the set of constraints in (12) to one single implementability constraint as of period
zero. In other words, under complete markets the government can construct a state contingent plan which
ensures solvency as of period zero. Under incomplete markets instead, the government has to adjust its plan,
i.e. the present value of the surplus, each period in response to the realized state of the economy such as to
ensure solvency.
14The intertemporal budget constraint of the government, including the requirement that the discounted
value of debt at inﬁnity be non-positive, is satisﬁed by Walras’ Law.
15Moreover, a continuous transition function seems to be in accordance with reality where strict constraints
usually do not exist. Consider, for example, the case of a debt contract. Usually, it is always possible to ﬁnd
some lender, no matter what the existing level of debt of the borrower or its capacity to pay-back the new
debt are. To ﬁnd such a lender is just a question of the size of the oﬀered interest rate in the contract (which15
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1+e x p( −δ (bt − bref))
,δ > 0, (15)
with Lt > 0a n d∂Lt







Since the inﬁnite double sum in (14) complicates the analysis of the policy problem, I
rewrite the Lagrangian recursively, following Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002).
I deﬁne a new stochastic multiplier μt = μt−1/γ + αt,w h e r eμ−1 = 0. The inﬁnite double






















. Using (15) and (16), the Lagrangian in





t {u(ct,n t)( 1 7 )
+ηt
 






















The ﬁrst order conditions to (17) w.r.t. ct,n t, and bt+1 are
ηt = uc,t + μt
 












0=un,t + ηtat + μt
 





































Now, an equilibrium under the politically optimal plan can be deﬁned as follows:
may indeed by a highly non-linear function in the level of debt or the capacity to pay-back that debt).
16For a derivation of (16) see Appendix B.16
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Deﬁnition 3. An equilibrium under the politically optimal plan is a set of sequences {bt,c t,
nt,ηt,μ t}∞
t=0 satisfying (11), (13) with I
 
bt;bref 
≈ Lt, and (18)- (20) for given exogenous
processes {at,g t}
∞
t=0 and initial values b0 and μ−1 =0 .
For γ = 1, Deﬁnition 3 implies the optimal policy of the Ramsey planner. For γ<1,
ﬁscal policy is still optimizing but optimization occurs with respect to the policy maker’s own
objective. In the following analysis, I refer to the case of γ = 1 as Ramsey-optimal policy
and to the case of γ<1 as myopic ﬁscal policy. In both cases, the government adheres to
commitments made in the past when choosing policy (see, for example, Chari and Kehoe,
1999).
2.4 Equilibrium and steady state analysis
In this subsection, I analyze the equilibrium properties under Ramsey-optimal policy and
myopic ﬁscal policy in order to show the main diﬀerences between the two regimes and to
illustrate the eﬀects of the transaction costs and the SBC. The non-stochastic steady state is
deﬁned as the long-run equilibrium in absence of shocks and where all endogenous variables
grow with a constant rate equal to zero. I drop the time subscript of a variable to denote its
non-stochastic steady state, henceforth.
First, I illustrate the eﬀects of γ and φ in the model without SBC, i.e. where κ =0 .I n
(20) we see how the policy maker equates the budget relaxing eﬀect of issuing new debt to
the associated higher expected ﬁne and transaction costs. For the case of Ramsey-optimal







Equation (22) shows that under incomplete markets and no transaction costs the allocation
and in particular welfare depend on initial conditions and not only on policy. To remove the
unit root from the system, I thus assume that φ>0. Then, the non-stochastic steady state
is independent of initial conditions and it is possible to compare welfare under the diﬀerent
regimes.
Next, I consider the case of myopic ﬁscal policy and φ>0 (while κ = 0 throughout).
Then, (20) can be used to illustrate the eﬀect of γ and φ on the level of debt. In the
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For γ =1⇒ b/y = 0 which gives the reference case of Ramsey-optimal policy with zero
debt. If γ<1 ⇒ b/y > 0. Myopia leads the government to cut taxes and issue debt. This
policy continues until the increase in transaction costs and the associated rise of the interest
rate close the gap between the discount factors of the government and the household. In the
long run this policy leads to a positive level of debt.17 For φ → 0 ⇒ b/y →∞ . Without
the SBC, b/y is thus determined by the size of γ and φ. Accordingly, the second purpose of
φ>0 (next to the elimination of the unit root) is to ensure a well deﬁned steady state under
myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC by preventing the path of debt to be explosive.
Now, I analyze the eﬀects of the SBC, i.e. κ>0. For the case of myopic ﬁscal policy






















The second term on the RHS gives the eﬀect of the SBC on b/y. Given that κ>0,
∂[κ(b−bref)L]





> 0 since marginal utility uc and the
Lagrange multipliers η and μ are strictly positive for binding resource and implementability
constraints. Hence, (23) shows that the introduction of the SBC tends to reduce b/y.




































Even for γ = 1, the ﬁrst equation shows that the SBC ensures independence of initial condi-
tions by removing the unit root from the system. The second equation implicitly gives the
level of debt in steady state and indicates that the introduction of the SBC rules out explo-
sive paths of debt. However, to be able to numerically compare welfare under myopic ﬁscal
policy before and after the introduction of the SBC, I maintain the assumption of positive
transaction costs throughout the analysis.
Now, I turn to an interpretation of (18). To simplify the comparison between the two
regimes, I consider the case of log-utility here. Then, in the non-stochastic steady state (18)
17With positive debt in steady state ﬁscal policy needs to generate surpluses in order to ﬁnance permanent
interest payments. This is the reason why I do not consider a deﬁcit criterion in this model.18
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with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Equation (24) provides information on η which measures in terms of utility
the value attributed to a relaxation of the resource constraint in the long run. For the limiting
case of φ → 0 the last term on the RHS vanishes. Under Ramsey-optimal policy γ = 1 and
(24) reads η = 1
c = uc. Relaxations of the budget and the resource constraint are valued






< 0s ot h a tη<u c (given that b,c,μ > 0). This inequality implies that,
due to myopia, a relaxation of the resource constraint in the long run is valued less by the
policy maker than a relaxation of the budget constraint by the household.
3 Calibration and welfare measure
3.1 Calibration
This subsection describes the baseline calibration of the model. All parameters are calibrated
to a quarterly frequency. Government spending gt and productivity at are assumed to follow
independent stationary AR(1) processes in their logarithms
lngt =( 1 − ρg)lng + ρg lngt−1 + ε
g
t





t are n.i.d. with mean zero. Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007), the
standard deviations of the innovations are σεg =0 .016 and σεa =0 .0064 and ρg = ρa =0 .9.
I set the expected planning horizon of the government h to twelve years. This value
corresponds to three legislative periods and is supposed to loosely reﬂect the time in oﬃce of
an average member of the executive authority. From h =1 /[4(1 − γ)] it implies a value of











The weight for working time in utility is ν = 4 and σ and ϕ are set to unity. These values imply
an equal division of the total time endowment into working time and leisure, for convenience.
In Section 5.2, I discuss alternative values for σ and ϕ. The household’s discount factor is
β =0 .99.19
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In order to try replicating Ramsey-optimal policy where debt is zero in steady state (see
Section 2.4), I set the reference value of debt in the SBC to bref = 0 in most of the analysis.
Hence, while the structure of the proposed SBC reﬂects features of the SGP, its calibration
is stricter than the 60% debt-to-GDP criterion of the SGP and sets a lower reference value
of debt, as suggested by the theoretically optimal ﬁscal policy. To assess the eﬀectiveness
of the SBC, the policy parameter κ varies between 0 an 0.016. Given a steady state value
of y = n =0 .5, the upper bound implies a ﬁne of about 3% of GDP per unit of debt
exceeding bref. The parameter governing the size of the transaction costs φ is set to 0.01.
In steady state, this value implies an increase of the interest rate (which equals R =1 .02073
under myopic ﬁscal policy) of about four basis points on an annual basis when b/y increases
by one percent. It is well within the estimates for the eﬀect of debt on the government’s
borrowing costs (see Gale and Orszag, 2003, Engen and Hubbard, 2004, or Laubach, 2009).
The parameter in the logistic function is set to δ = 300 which gives a smooth approximation
of the indicator function, as shown by Franses and van Dijk (2000). The value of government
consumption g is set to 0.1 such as to obtain a ratio of g/y =0 .2 under Ramsey-optimal
policy, corresponding to the average share of government consumption in GDP in the OECD
countries (see OECD, 2009b). In Section 5, I discuss the alternative of ﬁxing the ratio g/y
instead of the absolute value of g itself. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of the
baseline calibration.
Table 1: Parameter values of the baseline calibration to a quarterly frequency.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Household discount factor
γ [0.979;1] Myopia
ν 4 Weight of labour in utility
σ 1 Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ϕ 1 Inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity
ρg 0.9 Serial correlation government consumption
ρa 0.9 Serial correlation productivity
σεg 0.016 St. dev. of innovation to gov. consumption
σεa 0.0064 St. dev. of innovation to productivity
¯ g/y 0.2 Government consumption to GDP
κ [0;0.016] Tightness of the SBC
bref 0 Reference value of debt in the SBC
φ 0.01 Transaction cost parameter
δ 300 Smoothness of the logistic function20
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3.2 Welfare measure
Since the steady state of the economy depends on policy, I use two methods to compute
the welfare eﬀects of myopic ﬁscal policy and the SBC. The ﬁrst method considers pure
shifts of the steady state of the economy, while the second method accounts for the period
of transition between these. In both cases welfare is based on the representative household’s
utility. Following Jonsson and Klein (2003), in the ﬁrst case welfare is measured as expected
lifetime utility while in the second case it is measured as lifetime utility under perfect foresight.
3.2.1 Welfare under uncertainty
The ﬁrst measure illustrates the size of welfare eﬀects associated with pure shifts of both the





Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007) and based on household utility (see 1), I then
deﬁne welfare under Ramsey-optimal policy, denoted by R, conditional on the state of the
economy in period j = 0 being the non-stochastic steady state associated with that regime
and remaining under that regime forever as












t+j denote the particular plans for consumption and working time under
regime R. In the same way, I deﬁne welfare under myopic ﬁscal policy, denoted by M,a s












t+j are functions of myopia γ.
Now, let λM denote welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy in terms of consumption. It is
deﬁned as the fraction of the Ramsey consumption process that a household would be willing
to give up to be as well oﬀ under policy M as under policy R:
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Using (25) with σ =1 ,ϕ =1 ,a n dν = 4 and rearranging terms yields


































1 − λM 
1 − β
+ V R
Solving for λM gives
λM =1− exp
  




To compute λM, I use the approximated policy functions for V M and V R. In particular,
the solution to the system of equations of Deﬁnition 3 and (26) gives Vt as a function of en-
dogenous and exogenous state variables xt and a parameter scaling the standard deviations
of the exogenous shocks ω : V (xt,ω) (see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004). Using pertur-
bation methods, a second-order approximation to Vt around the non-stochastic steady state,
denoted by ¯ x, yields









where Vx and Vxx denote the ﬁrst and second derivative w.r.t xt, respectively, and where I
used that in the non-stochastic steady state ω = 0. To compute welfare, I evaluate V (xt,ω)
assuming that the initial state x0 is equal the non-stochastic steady state ¯ x, i.e. x0 =¯ x and
ω =0 :




Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004) show that certainty equivalence also holds for a ﬁrst-order
approximation when using perturbation methods which implies that Vω (¯ x,0) = 0, yielding
V (x0,0) ≈ V (¯ x,0) +
1
2
Vωω (¯ x,0)ω2. (32)
Up to ﬁrst order accuracy, welfare is given by its non-stochastic steady state value V (¯ x,0),
as can be seen from the RHS of (32). The second term on the RHS of (32) gives the shift
of the level of V (x0,0) due to uncertainty and hence gives the diﬀerence between the non-
stochastic and the stochastic steady state of that variable. The size of the shift depends on22
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ω which in turn depends on the standard deviation of the innovations to factor productivity
and government consumption, as calibrated in Section 3.1.
Finally, to obtain λM, I evaluate V M (xt,ω)a n dV R (xt,ω) in the state of the economy
in period j = 0 being the non-stochastic steady state associated with the respective regime,
yielding V M and V R. Identical non-stochastic steady states imply that V M(¯ x,0) = V R(¯ x,0).
This is the case in the analysis of Section 4.3 where only business cycle eﬀects are considered.
To obtain the ﬁrst and second order approximations to the policy functions, I use the software
package Dynare 4.1 for Matlab.18
3.2.2 Welfare under perfect foresight
It takes time for the economy to move from one steady state to another and the measure
in (31) neglects welfare eﬀects during this period of transition. Therefore, I use a second
method to measure welfare which accounts for the transitional period. To give a preview,
using (31) I ﬁnd that more than 99.8% of the welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy are due to a
distorted non-stochastic steady state (see Section 4.1). Following Jonsson and Klein (2003),
the second method thus considers only welfare eﬀects under perfect foresight.
I deﬁne welfare under regime R as the discounted sum of household period utility under
perfect foresight conditional on the state of the economy in period j = 0 being the non-













t+j denote consumption and working time under policy R. Welfare under a
transition from the superior regime R to the inferior regime M is then simply deﬁned as the
discounted sum of household period utility conditional on the state of the economy in period
j = 0 being the non-stochastic steady state associated with regime R, changing permanently













t+j denote consumption and working time under this scenario. Then,
welfare costs ΛRM (in terms of consumption under regime R) associated with a permanent
change from regime R to regime M are deﬁned as in (30) but for the case of perfect foresight.
18The software package is available at http://www.dynare.org.23
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For the given utility function they are given by
ΛRM =1− exp
  




To obtain WRM, I exogenously change γ from γ =1t oγ =0 .979 in period j = 1 and
compute the deterministic path of transition between the two regimes, using Dynare 4.1.
4 Numerical analysis of the soft borrowing constraint
In this section, I analyze the eﬀects of the SBC on welfare under the following four scenarios:
(i) A shift, due to myopic ﬁscal policy and relative to Ramsey-optimal policy, of both the
non-stochastic steady state and the stochastic steady state, neglecting the period of transi-
tion, (ii) a debt accumulating transition under perfect foresight from the steady state under
Ramsey-optimal policy to the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC, (iii) a
debt consolidating transition under perfect foresight, induced by the introduction of the SBC,
from the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC to the steady state under my-
opic ﬁscal policy with SBC, and (iv) short run welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy with SBC
relative to Ramsey-optimal policy.
4.1 Long run eﬀects of myopia and the soft borrowing constraint
In this ﬁrst scenario, I analyze the long run welfare eﬀects of the SBC by ﬁrst setting κ =0
and computing welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC. Then, I introduce the SBC
by setting κ>0 and show that this enhances welfare.
4.1.1 Myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC: κ =0
This subsection presents results closely related to Kumhof and Yakadina (2007). These results
illustrate the eﬀects of myopia before the introduction of the SBC, i.e. here I set κ =0 .F i g u r e
1 depicts the steady states of the model’s key variables for diﬀerent values of myopia γ.I n
particular, γ varies between 0.979 (the value implied by the baseline calibration of a planning
horizon of twelve years) and 1 (which implies Ramsey-optimal policy as h →∞ ).
The upper left panel shows welfare costs as deﬁned in (31) and expressed as percentage:
λM × 100. As myopia increases welfare costs amount up to 0.353% of the Ramsey-optimal
consumption stream. The solid line shows welfare costs when V M and V R are approximated
up to ﬁrst-order accuracy while the circles depict the approximation up to second-order24
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of myopia on the steady state: γ ∈ [0.979,1]. Upper left panel: solid line –
non-stochastic steady state, circles – stochastic steady state.
accuracy. The two lines are virtually identical for the considered range of γ. The upper right
panel depicts the diﬀerence between the two lines which increases as γ decreases. However,
for the given calibration and κ =0 .979 the welfare costs due to a distorted stochastic steady
state amount only to about 0.12% of total welfare costs. The utmost part of welfare costs, i.e.
approximately 99.88%, is due to a distorted non-stochastic steady state. The other panels
thus concentrate on the non-stochastic steady state.
In the middle left panel we see how the ratio of debt to GDP increases as myopia increases.
For γ =0 .979 it amounts to 103%. As can be seen from the middle right panel, labour taxes
increase from 20% to about 22% to ﬁnance the permanently higher debt servicing costs as
debt increases. Higher debt implies an increase of the interest rate. To illustrate that welfare
costs are not only due to the increase of the interest rate, which is governed by the transaction
cost parameter φ, I compute λM for the particular case of φ → 0. Holding the level of debt to
GDP constant at the level implied by the baseline calibration, i.e. b/y =1 .03, and letting γ
adjust endogenously, gives that for the limiting case of φ → 0 ⇒ λM → 0.162% (where I set
φ =1 0 −9 in the limit). Thus, in this particular case welfare costs are smaller as compared to25
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the baseline calibration where λM =0 .353%. This leads to an increase of the excess burden
of taxation which reduces welfare. Higher tax rates depress working time and hence GDP
(see lower left panel) and consumption. Since the level of government consumption is ﬁxed,
the ratio of government consumption to GDP increases.
In sum, a ratio of debt to GDP of 103% implies welfare costs of 0.353%. Second order
welfare costs are negligible, as in Lucas (2003). Using ﬁgures for quarterly per capita income
in the Euro-zone in 2009 and a share of 60% of ﬁnal consumption in GDP, total welfare costs
amount to about 7,000 × 0.6 × 0.00353 ≈ 15 euros per person per quarter. These numbers
provide the rationale for the subsequent analysis ﬁnding the optimal κ.
4.1.2 Introducing the soft borrowing constraint: κ>0
Now, I turn to an analysis of the long run welfare eﬀects of the SBC by setting κ>0. The
aim is to determine the value for κ that reduces the long run level of debt and taxes, and
hence welfare costs. I set the reference value of debt to bref = 0 in order to try replicating
the non-stochastic steady state under Ramsey-optimal policy where b = 0 (see Section 2.4





= κbtLt (300,b t,0) =
κbt
1+e x p( −300bt)
. (34)
Figure 2 shows the steady states of the debt to GDP ratio, the tax rate, and the associated
welfare costs for diﬀerent values of κ ∈ [0,0.005], holding ﬁxed γ =0 .979. As κ increases,
welfare costs are reduced, as can be seen from the upper panel. As before, there is virtually
no diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second order approximations (depicted as a solid line and
circles, respectively) to the policy functions of V M and V R.
Av a l u eo fκ>0 implies that the issuance of debt is associated with additional costs to the
government which now has to pay a ﬁne to the supranational institution for any b>0. These
costs increase as κ increases and induce a reduction of debt in steady state (see middle panel).
In the lower panel we see that the tax rate can be reduced, and thus the deadweight loss, as
steady state debt declines. The long run level of debt thus depends on the tightness of the
SBC, i.e. on the value of κ. For the given calibration, κ<0.003 is not suﬃcient to completely
prevent excessive borrowing. However, for κ ≥ 0.003 the incentive to reduce debt due to the
presence of the SBC outweighs the eﬀect of myopia. In particular, for κ =0 .003 the non-
stochastic steady states under myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC and under Ramsey-optimal
policy are identical up to the third signiﬁcant digit. This implies that 99.88% of the welfare26
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of the tightness of the SBC on the steady state: κ ∈ [0,0.005].
costs associated with myopic ﬁscal policy can be prevented. Since GDP in steady state is
approximately y = n ≈ 0.5, a value of κ =0 .003 implies a ﬁne on excessive debt of 0.6% of
GDP per unit of debt exceeding bref. For any κ ≥ 0.003 the steady state ﬁne payments are
zero because debt is at its reference value, i.e. b = bref = 0. In sum, the proposed SBC is
an eﬀective means to prevent excessive borrowing. It is possible to implement the same long
run allocation as under Ramsey-optimal policy and thereby prevent the utmost part of the
welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy.
4.2 Transitional dynamics under a soft borrowing constraint
Since it takes time for the economy to move from one steady state to another steady state, in
this subsection I analyze how myopic ﬁscal policy and the SBC aﬀect welfare when the period
of transition is accounted for. I consider two scenarios: (i) A transition from Ramsey-optimal
policy to myopic ﬁscal policy, and (ii) a transition from myopic ﬁscal policy without SBC to
myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC. The rationale for the analysis in (i) is to analyze the welfare
consequences of myopic ﬁscal policy and the SBC with regard to the reference case of Ramsey-27
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optimal policy when taking into account welfare eﬀects during the debt accumulating period
of transition. In (ii) the idea is to answer the following question: Given a level of debt to
GDP of 103%, does the introduction of the SBC and the induced reduction of debt outweigh
the costs of higher tax rates during the period of consolidation? Since welfare costs of a
distorted stochastic steady state amount only to 0.12% of total welfare costs (see previous
subsection), I consider a transition under perfect foresight in both cases, following Jonsson
and Klein (2003). For the computations, I set T =5 ,000.
4.2.1 Preventing debt accumulation
Figure 3 shows the debt accumulating transition from the steady state under Ramsey-optimal
policy to the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy. In period zero the economy operates
under Ramsey-optimal policy with γ = 1. This regime is replaced by myopic ﬁscal policy

























Figure 3: Transition under perfect foresight from the steady state under Ramsey-optimal
policy (with γ = 1) to the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy (with γ =0 .979).
As we can see from the ﬁgure, the transition is completed within about 25 years. At the28
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beginning of the transition the government lowers tax rates and issues debt. This stimulates
output and consumption and the household’s period utility rises above its initial steady state
for about 20 quarters. From then onwards, the tax rate is raised above its initial level to
ﬁnance additional debt servicing costs as debt rises. In the long run, debt builds up to 103%
of GDP.
The associated welfare costs of this transition under perfect foresight, as compared to









This value is about half of the welfare costs as measured in the previous subsection where
λM only considers steady state eﬀects and does not account for the positive welfare eﬀects
in the ﬁrst 20 quarters of the transitional period.
As the previous subsection showed, the long run level of debt is zero for κ ≥ 0.003. Thus,
by setting κ ≥ 0.003 from period j = 0 onwards the supranational institution can ensure
that the economy remains in the steady state under Ramsey-optimal policy.19 There will
be no transition to the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy. Hence, in this scenario the
introduction of the SBC avoids welfare losses of 0.141%.
4.2.2 Debt consolidation
Now, suppose that we are in the steady state under myopic ﬁscal policy where the ratio of
debt to GDP equals 103%. This subsection addresses the question whether it is possible to
increase welfare by imposing the SBC and thereby induce debt consolidation and, if so, which
is the optimal parameter combination of κ and bref that the supranational institution should
choose.
For three particular combinations of κ and bref (see below), Figure 4 shows the transition
from the steady state without SBC (where κ = 0) to a new steady state with SBC (where
κ>0a n dbref ≥ 0). In all three cases I set κ>0 from period j = 1 onwards. The ﬁgure
shows the ratio of debt to GDP, the tax rate, and the ﬁne payments (as speciﬁed in 34). In
all three cases the introduction of the SBC induces a transition to a new steady state. The
new steady state and the time to reach the new steady state depend on κ and bref.
Now the question is: Which is the optimal parameter combination of κ and bref that
weighs the costs of higher taxes and ﬁne payments during the period of consolidation to the
19This is numerically conﬁrmed by setting κ =0 .003 for periods j =0 ,...,T and γ =0 .979 for periods
j =1 ,...,T.29
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Figure 4: Debt consolidating transition from the steady state without SBC (κ =0 )t oa
new steady state with SBC (κ>0) for diﬀerent combinations of κ and bref, respectively:
dash-dotted line (0.001,0.4), solid line (0.002,0.2), dashed line (0.013,0).
long term beneﬁts of lower taxes? To answer this question, as before, I measure welfare costs
of the inferior policy in terms of consumption of the superior policy. Since the conjecture is
that welfare increases by introducing the SBC, welfare costs of remaining in the steady state
without SBC and not consolidating are measured relative to a transition to a new steady state
with SBC. That is, positive welfare costs imply welfare gains of consolidation. Let welfare
in the steady state without SBC be denoted by WM and welfare for some particular path of
consolidation be denoted by Wsbc,w h e r eM and sbc denote the respective regimes. WM is
deﬁned as the discounted sum of household period utility under perfect foresight conditional
on the state of the economy in period j = 0 being the steady state associated with regime













t+j denote consumption and working time under regime M. Welfare of a30
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transition from regime M to regime sbc is then deﬁned as the discounted sum of household
period utility conditional on the state of the economy in period j = 0 being the steady state
associated with regime M, changing to regime sbc in periods j =1 ,...,T and taking into













t+j denote consumption and working time in case of consolidation. This
deﬁnition implies that Wsbc is a function of κ and bref. Then, for the given calibration,








Figure 5 plots ΛMsbc × 100 as a function of κ and bref. The ﬁgure shows that for κ ∈
[0.001,0.013] and bref ∈ [0,0.45] there are welfare gains from consolidation, i.e. ΛMsbc ≥ 0.
For any parameter combination within this range, the introduction of the SBC and the
induced reduction of debt enhance welfare. The maximum welfare gain can be obtained for
κ =0 .002 and bref =0 .2. It amounts to ΛMsbc =0 .099%. Thus, the supranational institution
should set a proportional ﬁne of 0.4% of GDP per unit of debt exeeding the reference value
which in turn should be set to approximately 40% of GDP. Notice that this in turn implies
that it is not optimal to induce a complete reduction of debt to zero.
When looking only at the eﬀects of κ in Figure 5, the highest welfare gains can be realized
for values in the range of, approximately, 0.0015 to 0.005. In particular, there are large
increases in ΛMsbc for low values of κ, suggesting that already small ﬁne payments reduce
the attractiveness of borrowing and induce substantial consolidation eﬀorts. When looking
only at the eﬀects of bref, the highest welfare gains can be realized for values in the range of,
approximately, 20 to 50% of debt to GDP. While higher values of bref do not excert enough
pressure to consolidate, very low values of bref, in particular when combined with high ﬁnes,
imply high distortions in the near future.
Returning to Figure 4, the solid line shows the transition path for the optimal parameter
combination. It takes about 50 quarters to reduce debt to the target value of 40% of GDP.
The tax rate increases for about 30 quarters to pay back outstanding debt, before it converges
to a lower long run level given the lower permanent interest payments. The ﬁne payments
increase to a maximum of approximately 0.1% of GDP in period j =1a n dt h e nc o n v e r g e31
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Figure 5: Welfare gains of consolidation ΛMsbc × 100 as a function of the reference value of
debt bref ∈ [0,0.45] and the tightness of the SBC κ ∈ [0.0005,0.013].
to zero as debt approaches its reference value. Exemplarily, the dash-dotted line in Figure 4
shows the transition path for a relatively loose–in terms of consolidation incentives–parameter
combination, i.e. for κ =0 .001 and bref/y = 80%, which is associated with welfare gains
of 0.052%. Reducing debt from 100% to 80% of GDP already leads to substantial welfare
gains while only being associated with mildly increasing tax rates and ﬁne payments. The
dashed line shows the transition path for a relatively tight parameter combination, i.e. for
κ =0 .013 and bref/y = 0, which is associated with welfare gains of 0.004%. Here, the
adjustment to the new steady state is completed within only 15 quarters. Induced by high
ﬁne payments, debt is reduced to zero through a sharp increase of the tax rate which in turn
almost completely outweighs the long term beneﬁts. In sum, however, there is a wide range
of parameter combinations where the long run beneﬁts dominate and debt consolidation is
welfare enhancing.32
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4.3 Short run dynamics under a soft borrowing constraint
After showing that by imposing the SBC it is possible to eliminate distortions aﬀecting the
non-stochastic steady state of the economy, in this subsection I look at the short run welfare
costs of myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC, as compared to Ramsey-optimal policy.
Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007), both regimes are calibrated to have the same
non-stochastic steady state in order to concentrate on welfare costs of a distorted stochastic
steady state. In particular, Ramsey-optimal policy is characterized by setting γ = 1 and
κ = 0. As before, let this regime be denoted by R. Myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC,
denoted by SBC, is characterized by setting γ =0 .979, κ =0 .005, and bref =0 . T h e s e
values imply zero debt in the non-stochastic steady state for a government which would
otherwise accumulate debt up to 103% of GDP if the SBC was not imposed (see Section 4.1).
The value for κ is the lowest possible value for this parameter that still implies the same
allocation in the non-stochastic steady state under both regimes up to the fourth signiﬁcant
digit. All other parameters and functional forms are set according to the baseline calibration,
in both regimes.
Based on (26), welfare under each regime i = R,SBC, conditional on the state of the















t+j denote the particular plans for consumption and working time under
regime i. Using (36), the corresponding expression to (31) gives welfare costs of regime SBC
relative to regime R as
λsr =1− exp
  




To compute λsr, I use the policy functions for V SBC
t and V R
t approximated up to second
order accuracy which I evaluate at the common non-stochastic steady state x0 =¯ x:





Identical non-stochastic steady states, i.e. V SBC(¯ x,0) = V R(¯ x,0), imply that welfare costs
are determined by the second derivatives of the policy functions with respect to uncertainty,
V SBC
ωω and V R
ωω, and the parameter scaling the standard deviations of the exogenous shocks33
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For the standard deviations of the innovations given in the baseline calibration (see Section
3.1), short run welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC amount to λsr =0 .0010%.
This value indicates that welfare costs associated with shifts of the stochastic steady state are
quantitatively negligible since λsr is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than the welfare
costs computed in the previous subsections (see λM, ΛRM,a n dΛ Msbc).20 To illustrate the
robustness of this result to the calibration, I artiﬁcially double the standard deviations of the
innovations. The implied welfare costs remain small, although they increase to λsr =0 .0040%.
These ﬁgures show that, for the given calibration, it is welfare-enhancing to implement the
SBC since the associated welfare gains of reducing distortions aﬀecting the non-stochastic
steady state by far outweigh the welfare costs of increasing the costs of using debt to smooth
taxes over the cycle.
To further illustrate this ﬁnding, I also consider a balanced budget regime as a partic-
ular, well-known alternative to prevent debt accumulation. The balanced budget regime is
characterized by letting the tax rate respond endogenously in a model without debt. The
government budget constraint is then given by
gt = τtwtnt.
The calibration and functional forms of this regime are the same as for the other two regimes
such that the non-stochastic steady state is the same under all three regimes. Compared to
Ramsey-optimal policy, a balanced budget regime is associated with welfare costs of 0.0011%
and 0.0042% for the baseline calibration and the alternative calibration of the standard
deviations, respectively. As before, these numbers illustrate the limited gains of optimal
ﬁscal policy over the cycle as compared to improved long run policies. Moreover, they show
that the SBC is slightly preferable in terms of welfare to a balanced budget regime since it
allows for the use of debt to smooth taxes, but that quantitatively the two regimes are similar
when looking only at short run eﬀects.
To analyze the dynamics under regimes R and SBC, Figure 6 plots the impulse responses
under both regimes to a government spending shock. It shows debt, the tax rate, the ﬁne (as
deﬁned in (6) with I
 
bt;bref 
≈ Lt), and GDP. Debt and the ﬁne are expressed as absolute
20Moreover, it indicates the limited gains of optimal ﬁscal policy over the cycle, as in Schmitt-Groh´ ea n d
Uribe (2007).34
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deviations from their steady states (which are zero).
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a government spending shock under Ramsey-optimal policy
(solid line) and myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC (dashed line).
The solid line shows the impulse responses under Ramsey-optimal policy. We can see how
the government uses debt to smooth labour taxes. The dashed line depicts myopic ﬁscal policy
under a SBC. Again, the government uses both its instruments, debt and taxes. However,
under a SBC the government largely refrains from using debt to smooth taxes (even though
the ﬁne payments are relatively small and only amount to about 7×10−7 at the maximum).
In sum, this subsection shows that short run welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy under a SBC
are relatively small as compared to the gains of the SBC from the elimination of distortions
aﬀecting the non-stochastic steady state.
5 Discussion
Before I analyze the sensitivity of the results to alternative parameterizations, I discuss three
alternative assumptions on the structure of the model.35
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5.1 Welfare gains under alternative assumptions
The proposed SBC is assumed to be paid to a supranational institution to loosely reﬂect the
arrangements of the SGP. This assumption implies that ﬁne payments constitute social costs
to the economy, as can be seen from the resource constraint (9). Accordingly, already small
values for κ imply high costs of using debt and hence strong incentives to reduce excessive
borrowing. Alternatively, I assume that the ﬁne payments are private costs, i.e. they are
redistributed to the household in a lump-sum way. This assumption reduces the costs of
violating the SBC for a given value of κ. Then, to bring down debt to zero in steady state
( f r o m1 0 3 %o fG D Pf o rγ =0 .979), the tightness of the SBC has to increase to κ ≥ 0.02
as compared to the base model where any κ ≥ 0.003 implies zero debt in steady state.
However, there is no natural upper bound for κ which can be set, for example, by changing
the constitution. Hence, the alternative speciﬁcation does not alter the general eﬀectiveness
of the SBC. Moreover, under the alternative assumption welfare in steady state is aﬀected in
the same way for κ ≥ 0.02 because then steady state debt is zero such that there are no ﬁne
payments.
In the analysis of Section 4, I set the value of government consumption to ¯ g =0 .1s u c h
as to obtain a ratio of ¯ g/y =0 .2 under Ramsey-optimal policy. This assumption implies
that myopic ﬁscal policy leads to an increase of the ratio ¯ g/y because the steady state level
of output y is an increasing function of γ,w h e r e a s¯ g stays ﬁxed. Thus, welfare costs of
myopic ﬁscal policy include the increase of the share of government consumption (which here
is a waste of resources) in GDP. To isolate the welfare costs of positive levels of debt from
this composition eﬀect of GDP the ratio g/y has to be constant across regimes. Following
this alternative assumption, using the measure of welfare costs in (31), and approximating
the policy functions up to second order accuracy yields that welfare costs amount to λM 
=
0.022% (for γ =0 .979). This number is one order of magnitude smaller than the costs as
computed in Section 4.1 (where λM =0 .353%). However, the introduction of the SBC is as
eﬀective as before and more than 99% of these costs can be eliminated by preventing excessive
borrowing. Moreover, this alternative speciﬁcation implies economically implausible behavior
of ﬁscal policy in the short run since it implies that ﬁscal policy is set such as to hold the
ratio g/y constant in response to exogenous shocks.
Next, the model’s single endogenous state variable is debt. The main source of welfare
costs of myopic ﬁscal policy stems from a distorted steady state of this variable. The speci-
ﬁcation of the SBC directly addresses this distortion as it is based on the level of debt. To36
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assess the eﬀects of a second endogenous state variable in the model, I analyze myopic ﬁscal
policy and the introduction of the SBC in an economy with capital. Here, the government is
restricted to have the same instruments, i.e. it can tax labour income and issue one-period
non-state-contingent bonds. I assume the production function to be Cobb-Douglas using
labour and capital as inputs and I set the production elasticity of capital to 0.34, the rate
of depreciation to 0.025, and all other parameters and functional forms follow the baseline
calibration. It turns out that welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy are larger in this alternative
model. Using (31) and approximating the policy functions for the welfare measures up to
second order accuracy, welfare costs for γ =0 .979 amount to λM  
=1 .43%. These costs are
four times larger than the costs in the model without capital. Capital creates an additional
channel through which myopic ﬁscal policy reduces welfare. Higher taxes on labour depress
working time and thus the return on capital. This reduces the attractiveness of capital ac-
cumulation and hence the stock of capital in the long run. However, imposing the SBC with
κ =0 .005 in this model brings down the steady state level of debt to zero, again eliminating
more than 99% of these costs.
Finally, the model considers a closed economy. The alternative assumption of a small
open economy, without changing the functioning of the SBC, would complicate the analysis
since new assumptions would be needed to remove the unit root from the system which is
typically present in these models (see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2003).
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, I ﬁrst discuss the speciﬁcation of the SBC before I analyze the sensitivity
of the results to alternative parameters in the utility function. The SBC is speciﬁed in terms
of the absolute level of debt bt. Alternatively, I consider a speciﬁcation of the SBC in terms
of the ratio of debt to GDP bt/yt. This assumption leaves all the results virtually unchanged.
Since there is no growth in the model, the speciﬁcation in the absolute level of debt just
simpliﬁes the analysis.
There are two points to be addressed concerning the second order approximation of the
logistic function: One with respect to the long run analysis and one with respect to the short
run analysis. For the given calibration and κ =0 .005 (as in Section 4.3) the second order
approximation to the policy function for ft is given by:
ft =0 .0026bt +0 .3748b2
t, (38)37
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where the constant and the second derivative of the policy function with respect to uncertainty
are zero. To reduce excessive borrowing in the long run it is suﬃcient that the coeﬃcient
in (38) multiplying b2
t is positive. This ensures that whenever the government would like to
issue debt, which is the case for any γ<1, it has to pay a positive ﬁne. I checked that this
coeﬃcient is positive for all reasonable parameter combinations.21
Turning to the short run implications, (38) implies that for bt ∈ [−0.007;0] the ﬁne is
negative, turning into a transfer to the economy. This sign reversion would not be the case
if the logistic function was used instead and implies that the welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal
policy under a SBC in the short run analysis of Section 4.3 are underestimated. However, since
welfare costs of a distorted stochastic steady state amount only to λsr =0 .0010% and actual
ﬁne payments (and hence transfers) are quantitatively negligible for the given calibration
(see Figure 6) the approximation of the logistic function does not aﬀect the main results of
the analysis. Moreover, by using Dynare++, I checked up to a ﬁfth order approximation
to the policy functions for the model’s endogenous variables that welfare costs are virtually
identical to the case of a second order approximation, indicating the limited role of actual
ﬁne payments/ transfers for welfare.
Finally, I assess the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent values of σ and ϕ in the utility
function (see 25). In all cases, the value of ν is chosen such as to obtain a value of working
time of n =0 .5 in the non-stochastic steady state under Ramsey-optimal policy. Welfare costs
are measured using the corresponding expressions to (31) and (33) for the case of general
CRRA preferences, which are given by
λgen =1−
 
V M − VNR

















































t+j denotes working time under Ramsey-optimal policy. The parameters and the results
where λgen is approximated up to second order accuracy are summarized in Table 2. We can
see that for both measures welfare costs decrease as σ and ϕ increase. However, in all cases
21Notice that in the deterministic transition scenarios in Section 4.2 there is no need for an approximation
of the logistic function since the absence of uncertainty allows using a Newton method to solve simultaneously
all the original equations for all periods instead of using perturbation methods.38
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the introduction of the SBC brings down debt to zero in the non-stochastic steady state and
thus eliminates the main source of welfare costs.
Table 2: Welfare costs for diﬀerent parameters in the utility function.
Parameters Welfare costs a
nR νσ ϕ λ gen × 100 Λgen × 100
0.5 1.78 0.5 0.5 0.806 0.314
0.5 4 1 1 0.353 0.141
0.5 20 2 2 0.166 0.067
0.5 100 3 3 0.108 0.044
a Welfare costs are deﬁned in (39).
6 Conclusions
The standard Ramsey approach to optimal taxation cannot account for the high and per-
sistent levels of government debt that we observe in many OECD countries. Assuming a
myopic policy maker implies empirically more realistic positive levels of debt. In the absence
of lump-sum taxation the associated allocation is inferior in terms of welfare to the alloca-
tion under Ramsey-optimal policy and implies welfare costs of up to 0.35% of the Ramsey
consumption stream.
The paper proposes a legal restriction in the form of a soft borrowing constraint on
sovereign debt which is modeled as a proportional ﬁne on excessive debt and resembles
features of the SGP. The constraint prevents excessive borrowing in the long run and thereby
eliminates most of the welfare costs of myopic ﬁscal policy. The short run welfare costs of
the soft borrowing constraint, resulting from higher costs of using debt to smooth taxes over
the business cycle, are quantitatively negligible. Thus, the paper supports the views of those
who like to strengthen the rules of the SGP. It also provides an argument for the inclusion
of a debt break into the German constitution or for the advocates of balanced budget rules.
Conditioning the proportionality of the ﬁne payments on some state of the economy, for
example the level of output, could reduce the short run welfare cost of the SBC even further.
On the other hand, in a medium- or large-scale macroeconomic model with nominal and
real frictions the short run costs of the SBC might be larger. I leave both issues for future
research.39
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A Derivation of the implementability constraint
This appendix shows in detail how to derive the sequence of implementability constraints. To start
with, substitute out prices Rt and τt in the household’s budget constraint (2) by using the household’s














where Φ = πt was used. Rewrite (40) as
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Note that bt in (41) is non-state-contingent and thus the same for all future states of the economy.






yt in (41) which yields







Then iterate forward (42), i.e. replace bt+1 in (42) by the right hand side of (42), with the time index
adjusted one period ahead



















































where the last equality used the law of iterated expectations. Repeating this substitution j times for
future bond holdings bt+j yields




















































B Derivation of the inﬁnite double sum
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Now, express the square brackets recursively through the sequence of μt =
μt−1
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The LHS can then be written as
LHS = E0
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